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dummies. For instance, there may be reasons to believe that the authoritarian
effects of natural resources are signiﬁcantly lower than, and may even be outweighed by, the democratic effects of resource endowments in a region like
Latin America. Could the same be true of the effects on growth? By contrast,
are there other structural conditions under which the effects of resources
would be substantially more negative? There is little in the paper in the way
of empirics and even less in the way of theory to guide an inquiry into this
topic.
In sum, Lederman and Maloney provide a framework that helps one think
about the different channels through which resource endowments could
shape growth. For instance, they contrast the direct, positive effects of
resources on output with the indirect, possibly negative effects of resources
working through productivity parameters or labor force allocation. It would
be useful to know, as a theoretical as well as empirical matter, when each of
these effects might be stronger or weaker. The authors take steps in this direction by looking at constraints on the executive, though one could imagine
estimating a fuller set of interaction models in which the effect of resources
is conditioned on executive constraints. The recent political economy literature suggests an array of other conditioning variables that should also affect
the more proximate channels that Lederman and Maloney identify, including
the political regime (the growth-relevant features of which go well beyond
constraints on the executive), civil conﬂict, and so on. What is really lacking
at this point is a deeper theoretical framework that would link the effects of
natural resources to the mediating inﬂuence of this broader set of institutions.
Lederman and Maloney provide an important starting point, contributing to
an emerging research agenda that may lead to a deeper understanding of the
conditional effects of natural resources.
Cameron A. Shelton: The paper by Daniel Lederman and William Maloney
is part of a larger project of the authors.1 Their broader goal is to drive home
the point that the possession of natural resource wealth does not inevitably
lead to lower growth rates and thus lower per capita GDP. In their words, “the
central tendency is not negative” and natural resources are neither curse nor
destiny.

1. See Lederman and Maloney (2007a).
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Focus on the Conditional Effect
The authors identify four commonly discussed channels through which natural resources affect growth: secular decline in the terms of trade for natural
resources; few beneﬁcial spillovers (that is, human capital accumulation,
technological spillovers, and productivity growth) generated by primary sectors; Dutch disease (in combination with the first two channels); and political institutions. The section on “clarifying the curse” then places different
resource curse hypotheses into the context of a simple two-sector model. This
helps relate these hypotheses to the standard cross-country growth regressions framework and, by nesting these models, enables intelligent simultaneous discussion of the multiple channels identiﬁed above.
The authors (and the contributors to this edited volume) have done a good
job casting doubt on the ﬁrst three channels by demonstrating that the results
from Sachs and Warner and others, who contend that natural resource abundance is associated with poorer growth performance in the cross-section, are
not robust to a variety of measures, techniques, and samples. Furthermore—
and on this point a broad swath of the world’s population will no doubt agree
for the moment—there seems to be little evidence of a long-range secular
decline in primary sector prices.2 The evidence of poor technological progress
and few spillovers in primary sectors is inconclusive and does not seem to
apply broadly across all or even most countries and sectors. Finally, as the
authors point out, it is difficult to understand how Dutch disease—which
implies that natural resources gain a share of domestic labor at the expense of
manufactures and other export sectors—would be a problem for growth
unless either of the ﬁrst two channels holds.
If the mean effect of natural resources on growth is not robustly negative,
then the ball is back in the court of those suggesting a curse. That ball has
already been played, however. As the authors note, the resource curse literature has evolved and speaks now of a conditional resource curse; the current
quest is to understand the conditions under which natural resources lead to
counterintuitive poor performance rather than robust growth.
Lederman and Maloney argue that if the central tendency is positive—
if, on average, countries with natural resources perform better than their

2. See Cuddington, Ludema, and Jayasuriya (2007).
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resource-poor counterparts—then talk of a resource curse can be dismissed. They suggest that any industry may develop successfully or poorly
as a result of other internal factors, so natural resources are no different
than semiconductors or fashion.
I take a different view. My feeling is that whether or not the central tendency is positive, the large negative tail—those countries where natural
resource wealth has led to growth collapses or prolonged stagnation—is
of interest. There is now a great deal of careful and convincing evidence
that natural resource wealth is intimately and causally connected to the poor
growth performance of several countries. This alone belies the notion that
“natural resource wealth is wealth nonetheless” and distinguishes the natural
resource sector from the semiconductor or fashion industries. There are several distinguishing features of the natural resource sector: the volatility of
prices and the relative magnitude of the sector for many countries imply huge
swings in revenues, and the concentration of the rents and hence the ease of
their control means these bonanzas are often funneled into the public coffers,
invoking all the attendant complexities of public decisionmaking and the
added risk of a single decision. In theory, other sectors could exhibit these
characteristics; in practice, it is hard to think of any that do.
Consequently, exploring the conditions under which natural resources
lead to good or bad performance is probably more important than proving the
central tendency to be positive.3 It would more likely lead to useful policy
implications. The authors have prepared us well for this task by pointing out
one of the upcoming econometric difﬁculties.

Natural Resources as a Test of Institutions
The most promising explanations for natural-resource-driven growth collapses focus on interactions between natural resource wealth and institutions
of governance. The ﬁrst such explanation is that natural resource wealth promotes institutional weakness that leads to lower total factor productivity
(TFP) or slower TFP growth. The second is that natural resource wealth is
mismanaged by weak institutions, possibly leading to macroeconomic crisis
and the attending persistent effects on output. The ﬁrst category would include

3. Which is not to say that this latter is not also of interest. On the contrary, I very much
believe that natural resources are not always and everywhere detrimental to growth.
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Auty, Ross, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, and Isham and others.4 Happily,
rather than simply making vague appeals to unspecified institutions, these
contributions offer intelligent and intelligible arguments detailing the decisionmaking processes in question. While institutions often change only
slowly, sudden collapses in institutional quality are not impossible. This channel may thus be the result of either continued extraction of riches or a sudden
bonanza caused by discovery or, more likely, a jump in the commodity price.
Given that natural resources constitute a large share of GDP in some countries, and given that natural resource prices can increase sharply in a short
period of time, natural resource bonanzas can lead to huge jumps in government revenues.5 The question is whether these revenues will be put to good
use, wasted, or allowed to become actively detrimental. This highlights the
importance of the institutions of public choice. Natural resource wealth may
be simply embezzled by political elites, resulting in little beneﬁt to the development of the economy as a whole (and possibly causing harm by diverting
energy toward rent seeking, as per the ﬁrst explanation above). The bonanza
might be even more actively detrimental to growth, however. Tornell and
Lane document what they call a voracity effect, whereby a sudden inﬂux of
riches leads to a more than one-for-one increase in spending as interest groups
demand their share of the windfall.6 Because the process exhibits hysteresis—
that is, downward adjustments do not occur as quickly—any ebb in the
bonanza can lead to ﬁscal crises as expenditures remain high while revenues
collapse.7 Alternately, if the bonanza is large enough, the domestic economy
may not be able to absorb the additional spending immediately. When the revenue is raised without political cost, the motivation to restrain public expenditures is weak. If the windfall is not adequately smoothed into the future,
the sudden influx of public expenditures is likely to be inflationary, since the
domestic output of nontradables cannot compete with the sudden surge of
demand for them.

4. Auty (2001b); Ross (2001); Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003); Isham and others
(2005).
5. Witness not only oil prices in 1973–75, 1979–81, and 2005–present, but also the fact that
the price of gold more than tripled over the course of 1979; the price of copper doubled between
December 2003 and December 2005 and then doubled again in the next six months to a level
that has been sustained for the past two years; and the price of wheat almost quadrupled
between January 1972 and January 1974.
6. Tornell and Lane (1999).
7. See Alesina and Drazen (1991).
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It seems clear that natural resources provide a test: if spent wisely, they are
a source of wealth and even innovation; if spent poorly, they can lead to ﬁscal
imbalances and a politics rife with corruption, squabbling, and clientelism,
which may in turn contribute to future macroeconomic mismanagement. The
current hypotheses suggest that countries with good institutions (and good
luck) pass the test. Those with poor institutions fail and may do worse in the
long run than they would have without the natural resource wealth. At the
moment, the literature has something of a more difﬁcult time identifying
exactly what makes institutions robustly good. For instance, Venezuela was
able to use its oil wealth productively to fuel sustained growth from discovery
in 1920 through 1970. Nevertheless, the immense bonanza delivered by the oil
price shocks of the 1970s was mismanaged and perhaps led to the economy’s
sustained growth collapse.8 Why were the Venezuelan institutions robust
enough to channel the steady ﬂow, but unable to deal with the ﬂood?
Lederman and Maloney state that this second channel is not a true natural
resource curse. They acknowledge that a conditional curse may arise from
mismanagement, but they argue this is vastly different than the specter of the
resource curse; it simply represents poor macroeconomic policy. Again, I
take a slightly different view. In those cases where the test is failed, the
growth performance would presumably have been better in the absence of
natural resources. It is therefore correct to view natural resources as one of
the causal factors. Perhaps the language ought to be moderated to acknowledge the concomitant opportunity and danger.
The results in both this paper and their edited volume actually dovetail
well with this notion of natural resources as a test for the political institutions.
The ﬁndings of Manzano and Rigobon—that the curse operates through debtoverhang—essentially support the voracity effect.9 The quantile regression
results of this paper clearly demonstrate that the growth effects of natural
resources are conditional. Lederman and Maloney ﬁnd that the richest countries beneﬁted more from natural resources than the poorer countries. The
classic derivation of the growth regressions imposes homogeneity of initial
TFP and TFP growth. The introduction of institutional measures as additional
regressors is an attempt to condition on the predictable components of the
underlying heterogeneity in initial TFP. The next step is to identify exactly
what is being captured by the heterogeneity, but it is quite possible that this
heterogeneity springs from political institutions.
8. See Hausmann and Rodríguez (forthcoming); Moreno and Shelton (forthcoming).
9. Manzano and Rigobon (2007).

Daniel Lederman and William F. Maloney

49

The Role of Growth Regressions
One relevant question is whether traditional growth regressions can move
forward in addressing this conditional curse. Certainly one can reintroduce
heterogeneity through carefully considered interaction terms between measures of institutions and measures of natural resources. There are (at least)
two reasons for caution. First, Lederman and Maloney correctly point out that
even their preferred proxy for natural resource endowment, net exports of
natural resources per capita, is a function of per capita GDP and thus endogenous. Second, there are several reasons to believe that the Heckscher-OhlinVanek (HOV) theorem is violated—that net exports and endowments are
imperfectly correlated, even over horizons as long as a decade. Thus, even
the authors’ improved proxy falls short of the concept.
As the authors note, natural resource consumption increases with GDP.
Since net exports are the difference between domestic production and
domestic consumption, this implies that net exports are a function of GDP
and thus endogenous in a standard growth regression. They correct for this by
including a term for natural resource imports. The idea is to measure the
consumption effect through the decline in natural resource imports, while the
change in net exports of natural resources is due to changes in productivity.
This implicitly assumes that a country does not consume the natural resource
goods that it exports, so that the consumption effect can be measured separately from the production effect.10 Nonetheless, this is a clever step that
probably goes a fair way toward addressing the issue. (It would be nice to see
an analysis of how far.) More importantly, the technical appendix constitutes
exactly the kind of clear thinking about the proxy that is required to navigate
this econometric mineﬁeld.
Another important issue is the applicability of the HOV theorem and hence
the suitability of measuring endowments with net exports. There are several
causes for concern. Fujita, Krugman, and Venables show that agglomeration
effects in manufacturing can lead to symmetry breaking and persistent heterogeneity.11 As transport costs fall, two identical countries become specialized—
one in the primary sector, the other in manufactures. Thus one country exports
10. Consider the case of an economy with a single natural resource sector, such as oil. A
country will either export oil or import oil, so there will be no independent variation in imports
and net exports from which to separately identify consumption and productivity effects. The
independent variation arises because the productivity effect hits only the sectors produced
domestically, whereas the consumption effect presumably hits all sectors.
11. Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999).
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F I G U R E 3 . The Effects of FDI on Measured Natural Resource Intensity of Exportsa
A. Horizontal FDI: Wood and furniture
Country A:
Heavily wooded

Country B:
Product destination

Wood (242)

NXA : Furniture

Furniture (821)

Wood (242)

Furniture (821)

NXA : Wood

Furniture (821)

natural resources and the other manufactures, despite having identical endowments. One would have to further assume low rates of productivity growth in
the primary sector to deliver a resource curse, but the point is that two countries
with identical endowments and technologies can differ in their per capita net
exports of natural resources in a world with agglomeration effects, suggesting
a violation of the HOV theorem. Maloney contributes two further reasons for
caution when invoking the HOV theorem: persistent current account imbalances (which are clearly in evidence) and nonhomothetic preferences (about
which there is less evidence either way) upset the theorem.12
Finally, a model acknowledging certain frictions and returns to scale highlights the role of ﬁrms and foreign direct investment (FDI). In particular,
changes in transportation costs can lead to horizontal and vertical segmentation of the production chain, as illustrated in ﬁgure 3. In the ﬁrst panel, a
heavily forested country domestically produces the ﬁnal good, furniture, and
exports it to country B. The furniture industry then spreads to country B,
so that only wood is exported. On one level, this is a clear example of the
duality between trade in goods and trade in factors. Nonetheless, because
12. Maloney (2007).
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F I G U R E 3 . The Effects of FDI on Measured Natural Resource Intensity of Exportsa (Continued)
B. Vertical FDI: Cattle and leather
Country A:
Product destination

Country B:
Abundant cattle
Hides (211)

NXB : Clothing

Leather (611)
Clothing (841)

Hides (211)
NXB : Hides
– Leather
+ Clothing

Leather (611)
Clothing (841)

a. When export industries are given a binary classification of resource intensive (underlined) or not resource intensive, changes in vertical
and horizontal FDI, driven by changes in transport costs and the costs of long-distance management, can lead to changes in net exports of
natural resources absent any changes in endowments.

Leamer’s classification counts wood (1) but not furniture (0) as a resourceintensive good, horizontal FDI alters country A’s net exports of resourceintensive goods, as deﬁned by Leamer (and used by Lederman and Maloney).13
A similar measurement error is induced by vertical FDI. In the second panel,
country B is endowed with abundant grazing land and many cattle; it generates the entire production chain from hides to clothing domestically, leading it to export the final good, clothes. When the leather industry migrates
abroad, the production chain is broken up and both the intermediate and ﬁnal
goods are traded. As a result, the net exports of country B now include hides,
classiﬁed as a resource-intensive good. This analysis shows that changes in
the extent of vertical and horizontal FDI can alter the measured natural
resource content of a country’s exports even when there is no change in the
factor endowments. Indeed, in these examples the factor content of trade does
not change. The binary measure of natural resource intensiveness simply
13. Leamer (1984).
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leads to a measurement error that depends on the level of FDI. The extent of
vertical and horizontal FDI depends on transport costs and the ability to coordinate a global supply chain, factors that vary independently from natural
resource endowments.
One could argue that the choice between the different scenarios in the ﬁgure is caused by factor endowments. Furniture production will not take place
in country B unless it has the proper factors of production. This is true, on
average, but at the margin, changes in transport costs can enable a shift from
one scenario to the other. Moreover, the location decision may be driven by
factors of production other than the natural resources. For instance, the town
of High Point, North Carolina, used to be the center of a U.S. furniture making industry, but over the past decade, that industry has largely moved to
China . . . using wood imported from the eastern United States.14
Is this a serious source of measurement error? Is it more than simply white
noise? Are there secular trends in outsourcing? These are important issues
given that poor countries are relatively further away from the world’s intermediate and ﬁnal goods markets. Thus, transport costs and FDI constitute
another channel linking Y and NXnr.

Conclusion
I agree with much of the thrust of the authors’ research agenda: the central tendency probably is not strongly negative and may even be positive. There is
still evidence, however, that natural resources are not simply “riches nonetheless.” From a macroeconomic perspective, natural resources provide an
opportunity fraught with peril. I think the recent literature rightly focuses on
the determinants of a country’s ability to use the windfall productively. Perhaps curse is too strong a term, but there is clear evidence that some countries
fail this test with disastrous results. Cross-country regressions with interaction
terms may lead to a better understanding of the conditional effects of natural
resources, with the caveat that the relationship between even these authors’
preferred proxy and factor endowments is complex. Future work would do
well to emulate Lederman and Maloney in thinking clearly and explicitly
about endogeneity while extending their work toward explaining the sources
of heterogeneity.
14. Pete Engardio, “Can the U.S. Bring Jobs back from China?” Business Week, 30 June
2008.

